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Over thirty years since the passage of the Clean Water Act, much of the nation's 
rivers and streams fail to meet water quality standards. Pollution from nonpoint sources is 
increasingly responsible for these failures. Existing regulatory approaches may not be 
capable of meaningfully reducing water quality impairments due to their inability to 
control emissions from nonpoint sources. Water quality trading may provide a cost­
effective solution to many of the persistent water quality impairments caused by nutrients 
and other oxygen demanding pollutants. However, trading will require the presence of 
market participants - both buyers and sellers of pollution reduction credits - in order to 
be successful. Thus, the first paper in this thesis analyzes Tennessee's watersheds to 
determine which have the conditions necessary to support a successful water quality 
trading market. 
The second paper focuses on the reduction of pollution from nonpoint sources. 
Specifically, it estimates the social costs associated with a mandatory riparian grassed 
buffer strip for agricultural lands in the Harpeth River watershed in Middle Tennessee. In 
addition, this paper approximates a supply curve for buffer strips in this watershed. This 
latter result constitutes an important step towards understanding the supply of nutrient 
emissions reduction credits. The next step would be to estimate the reduction in nutrient 
runoff associated with these buffer strips. 
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A Brief Introduction to Water Quality Problems and Solutions 
Some History & Background 
A fire on the surface of the Cuyahoga River on June 22, 1969 caught the attention 
of American politicians and citizens alike. Fires began to plague the Cuyahoga River as 
early as 1939, due to high levels of pollution from oil and grease (Greenhalgh and Faeth); 
however, the fire of 1969 was the first to draw National attention, thanks to the initial 
article published in Time Magazine's brand new Environment section, which graphically 
described the Cuyahoga as "a river that oozes rather than flows. " Being contaminated by 
substances such as oil, grease, untreated sewage and various industrial wastes, this river 
was an extreme and very visible indicator of the types of water quality problems that 
were pervasive during the time period, and its burning spurred legislators to action. 
Shortly after the Cuyahoga came to national attention, the United States passed the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, commonly known as the 
Clean Water Act (CWA), to curb the effects of human activities on water quality. 
The CW A is still in force in 2005. Among the goals listed in the CW A are the 
"restor[ation] and maint[enance of] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation's waters," the elimination of "the discharge of pollutants into navigable water ... 
by 1985," and the prohibition of the discharge of any "toxic pollutants in toxic 
amounts. " 1 The means specified in the act to aid in the attainment of the goals include a 
1 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), (a)l, & (a)3 1 
permitting system, which came to be known as the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES), to be administered by state agencies to regul_ate point 
source (PS) emissions (e.g., discharges through pipes or ditches) to the nation's waters 
(US Environmental Protection Agency Office of Water, 2001). The CWA also states that 
the "national policy" is that measures be designed and implemented in a timely manner to 
curb the nonpoint source (NPS) contribution (including agricultural land runoff and other 
such diffuse sources) to pollutant loadings in waterways, though no specific means of 
achieving this goal are laid out in the legislation.2 This "national policy" established by 
Congress, though not explicit in methodology, recognizes the need for a combination of 
PS and NPS pollutant load reductions to meet the ambient water quality goals proposed 
by the CWA. 
Point Source Issues 
As required by the CW A, all PSs must have an NPDES permit to continue legally 
discharging into U.S. waterways (US Environmental Protection Agency Office of Water, 
2001 ). These permits place strict limits on the quantity of pollutants or the allowable 
concentration in polluters' effluents, and are normally based on available technology, 
except in instances where technology-based standards are insufficient to attain applicable 
water quality standards (Ryan). Technology-based standards have not been fruitless in 
bringing about decreases in the level of pollutant discharges. Many case studies, such as 
that of the Blue Plains Treatment Plant discharging into the Potomac Estuary, have 
shown improved water quality as a direct result of implementation of treatment plant 
2 33 U.S.C. § 125 l(a)7 
upgrades, and monitoring data at several hundred measurement stations throughout the 
nation have shown estimated 23% reductions in pollutants such as phosphorous and fecal 
. . . 
bacteria between 1974 and 1981 (Knopman and Smith). However, such improvements 
have not been without cost; between 1974 and 1994, federal and state/local governments 
invested $96 billion and $117 billion, respectively, in new and upgraded municipal 
wastewater treatment plants to meet standards imposed by NPDES permitting 
(Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies and the Water Environment 
Federation). Yet, implementation of the water treatment standards for PSs has not 
completely achieved the goals of the CW A. It has, on the other hand, substantially 
depleted the range of cost-effective options remaining for the control of PS discharges. 
Estimates from US EPA and AMSA put the funding needs of municipal treatment works 
over the next 20 years at approximately $139.5 billion and $330 billion, respectively, to 
fill currently unmet needs for water infrastructure nationwide (Association of 
Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies and the Water Environment Federation). Though these 
cost estimates vary widely, they are indicative of the great expense of improving water 
quality through regulation of PS polluters alone. 
Nonpoint Source Reductions: A More Cost-Effective Way? 
The good news is that it is not necessary to attain ambient-based water quality 
standards solely through increasingly strict PS regulation. Frequently, PS and NPS 
polluters emit the same or similar pollutants. NPS pollution from agriculture, in contrast 
3 
to PS pollution, does not require permitting and is not regulated by law, except in a few 
instances. 
Several trends have caused NPS pollution of the nation's waterways to become a 
quantitatively greater contributing factor to water quality impairments than point source 
emissions (US Environmental Protection Agency Office of Water, 2002). Population 
increase, for example, has promoted expansion of urban development as well as more 
intensive agricultural practices to meet the increasing food needs of a growing American 
public. NPS runoff is a national issue. In fact, when the states and territories performed 
a recent survey of the nation's waters, they found that 39% of the waters assessed were 
impaired for one or more uses, and EPA posits that the largest single contributor to water 
quality impairment is NPS runoff from agricultural lands (US Environmental Protection 
Agency Office of Water, 2002). 
Since agricultural runoff is typically not regulated or monitored, adoption of best 
management practices (BMPs ), which reduce soil erosion and runoff of wastes, among 
NPS polluters has, for the most part, been voluntary. Because of the voluntary nature of 
pollution abatement in the agricultural sector and 30 years of increasingly strict PS 
regulation, there is reason to suppose that a cost differential may exist between PSs and 
NPSs with regard to abating pollutants common to both groups, with NPS reductions 
being the less costly route for society as a whole. Because reduction of agricultural 
runoff has not traditionally been mandated by law, many relatively inexpensive options 
for pollution control may still remain for most agricultural producers; however, 
enforcement and monitoring of any pollution control standards for agriculture could be a 
4 
costly administrative problem due to the sheer number of individuals involved in the 
creation of NPS pollution (Russell and Clark). The question, then, is whether a policy 
instrument exists that can assist in achieving scientifically predetermined pollutant 
reductions in a cost-effective manner. 
Water Quality Trading: Is this the Policy Instrument We Seek? 
One method that could potentially reduce total abatement costs by taking 
advantage of the cost differential between PS and NPS polluters who emit the same 
contaminants is known as water quality trading (WQT), which is a market-based 
approach to pollution control in which one polluter can purchase a marketable emissions 
permit from another. The purchaser can increase emissions by the amount specified in 
the permit, while the seller must decrease emissions by an equivalent amount. Absent 
transactions costs or other market imperfections, trading would theoretically occur until 
the marginal abatement costs for all polluters in the market were equalized, yet the total 
emissions of the pollutant traded would not increase above limits designed to preserve or 
restore ambient water quality. Emissions could be limited to levels consistent with the 
goals of the CWA by restricting the number of government-issued permits. 
As with any tradable permit market, a WQT market would need a market driver to 
encourage economic activity. The CW A empowers EPA to establish a system of Total 
Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs ), which could function as such a driver by making 
additional pollution reduction necessary in areas where waters have been identified as not 
5 
meeting ambient water quality standards even after technology-based controls. 3 The 
CW A sates that "[ s ]uch load shall be established at a level necessary to implement the 
applicable water quality standards with seasonal variations and a margin of safety which 
takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent 
limitations and water quality;',4 thus, the TMDL system is an ambient-based standard, 
protecting water quality based on the amount of the pollutant the receiving water body 
can assimilate, rather than the level to which PSs could "reasonably" be expected to 
lower their emissions. EPA describes TMDLs as "pollutant budgets" in which the total 
allowable discharge is allocated across PSs and NPSs in the area (US Environmental 
Protection Agency Region 10). Assuming no transactions costs, once TMDLs are created 
for areas and waste loads are allocated between sources, allowing entities to trade those 
allocations amongst themselves would permit the sources to achieve the necessary 
abatement at a lower cost. 
Although many economists and policy-makers extol the savings potential of 
marketable permit systems, acceptance has been slow in regard to WQT, and only limited 
pilot programs are in place in the United States. EPA has expressed interest in and 
support for WQT. EPA has formally endorsed WQT since 1996 in the Draft Framework 
for Watershed-Based Trading (US Environmental Protection Agency Office of Water, 
1996). This document supports "offset" trading, rather than a watershed-based "cap and 
trade" program. Under an offset program, a polluter under regulatory pressure to further 
reduce emissions ( such as a PS whose emissions cap has been lowered) has the option of 
3 33 U.S.C. §1313(1)(A) 
4 33 u.s.c. §1313(1)(C) 
paying another polluter (a PS or NPS) to meet abatement requirements. In contrast, a cap 
and trade system would require that tradable effluent permits be issued to all polluters in 
a watershed, thus allocating specific abatement responsibilities to individual PSs and 
NPSs, in accordance with the abatement required by applicable TMDLs, and then 
allowing sources to buy and sell permits. 
Overview of Subsequent Chapters 
This chapter has presented a brief introduction to water quality issues in general, 
and WQT as a potential part of the solution. 
Chapter II is a review of the literature regarding tradable emissions rights and the 
economic theory on which these systems are based. Also included in chapter II is a 
discussion of policy concerns, as well as operational programs that allow trading of 
discharge responsibilities between polluters. 
Chapter III develops a methodology for comparing distinct watershed areas based 
on their suitability for WQT as determined by various factors, including location of PS 
and NPS polluters with respect to water quality impairments, and the extent of the 
impairments to which they contribute. 
Chapter IV describes a methodology for plotting some approximation of a supply 
curve for agricultural riparian buffers, which is a BMP that aids in the reduction of 
nutrient pollution in agricultural runoff. With some extensive water quality modeling, 
this process could be expanded to approximate a supply curve for NPS nutrient 
reductions. 
7 
Chapter V is a summary that includes some overall conclusory remarks with 
regard to the aforementi�ned chapters. 
8 
Chapter II 
A Review of the Literature 
Introduction 
This chapter will provide a review of literature related to tradable emissions rights 
and WQT specifically. Herein, some of the theory behind trading of discharges is 
reviewed, a few issues of program design are discussed, and some notable WQT 
programs and their successes are summarized. 
The Conceptual Basis for Trading Pollution Allowances 
According to Coase ( 1960), property rights (not just property itself) may be 
appropriately viewed as factors of production. He effectively shows that market 
transactions can ( absent transactions costs) optimally allocate the use of resources 
between two economic agents that reciprocally harm one another (i.e., one operator must 
incur some cost in order to avoid imposing some cost on the other). In such a case the 
owners of the two enterprises may enter into bilateral negotiations to achieve socially 
optimal use of their combined resources. Such negotiations are relatively cost free when 
few economic agents are involved; however, in the instance of a factory that produces 
smoke, Coase hypothesizes that transactions costs would be prohibitively high due to the 
vast number and diversity of individuals and organizations adversely affected. High 
transactions costs would, in tum, bring about a suboptimal allocation of resources since 
they would prevent some negotiations from proceeding. In such cases, Coase suggests 
9 
government regulation may be preferable to negotiations because it has the potential to 
effectuate reductions in discharges even when socially beneficial trades would be 
precluded by transactions costs; however, such regulation may come at high 
administrative costs to government as well as great control costs to polluters. 
Furthermore, since allowable pollutant discharges would be determined by the 
government to protect environmental quality based on imperfect data, rather than through 
negotiations between the polluter and all adversely affected groups, there is no reason to 
believe that social welfare would be optimized. Thus, due to the existence of transactions 
costs ( or administrative costs) and imperfect information, socially optimal solutions may 
be unattainable in regional and global pollution control problems. 
Hung and Shaw note that, in the case of pollution, social efficiency ( optimality) is 
an impractical standard because it poses a heavy information burden for the regulatory 
agency. They state that in the case of pollution control, the standard of cost­
effectiveness, or meeting a regulatory environmental standard at least cost, is the 
generally accepted policy goal for economists. WQT is a hybrid system. It includes 
elements of government regulation, which causes polluters to reciprocally harm each 
other by limiting aggregate use of water for the discharge of residuals. The system also 
includes bilateral negotiations between these parties that are reciprocally harmful to one 
another, thus reducing transactions costs by reducing the number of entities involved in 
the negotiation process. 
10 
Issues of Program Design for WQT 
Hung and Shaw's study proposes a trading system based on predetermined 
trading ratios to minimize transactions costs. Under this type of system, a watershed 
would be divided into zones in which the discharge of one �it of a pollutant would have 
·approximately the same environmental impact. Each zone would have a maximum 
discharge cap imposed by quotas that could be traded at a ratio of 1: 1 within the zone. 
The inter-zone trading ratios would be determined by the rate at which the pollutant is 
transferred from one zone to another, and would be published by the regulating agency to 
improve information and reduce transactions costs. As an added benefit, the zonal 
system would eliminate incentives for an upstream polluter to purchase reductions from a 
downstream polluter, as downstream reduction would not affect upstream loadings. The 
elimination of this incentive could reduce the potential for inter-zone pollution hotspots; 
however, intra-zone trading could cause the occurrence of hot spots within individual 
zones, unless zones were very small so that the environmental impacts within the zone 
were approximately equal. This begs the question: How equal is "approximately equal"? 
Or, how small would the zones have to be? If the regulatory agency bears the cost of 
information provision to reduce transactions costs, a trade-off between administrative and 
transactions costs becomes evident as the _number of zones multiplies. 
While Hung and Shaw's design is specific to PSs, the authors state that it could be 
expanded to include NPS polluters as well. Allowing trading between NPS and PS 
polluters, many economists agree, may provide the greatest potential for abatement cost 
savings (Horan and Shortle, Faeth); however, this introduces the issue ofNPS:PS trading 
11 
ratios. There is an extensive literature discussing such ratios, as well as their purposes 
and effects. Horan and Shortle, for example, note that risk is often the major focus of 
debate concerning trading ratios, and that the uncertain effectiveness of NPS control 
methods (i.e. NPS control is less dependable, or more risky) is often used as a 
justification for setting ratios at levels greater than unity in existing programs. However, 
they posit that this logic only accounts for part of the risk, as NPS pollution, which is 
dependent on weather events and input use, is extremely stochastic in the first place; thus, 
controlling NPS pollution may create a greater stability in pollution levels, reducing the 
risk of high pollutant loadings during adverse weather events. They propose that the real 
reason for trading ratios above unity is the current regulatory system, under which 
agricultural NPS polluters have been effectively granted the right to pollute. In existing 
trading programs of the offset type endorsed by EPA, only PS polluters are monitored 
and regulated by the NPDES permitting program. If trading program authorities could 
allocate permits to all sources (including agricultural NPS polluters), then NPS:PS 
trading ratios less than one would be acceptable because this would encourage greater 
abatement of risky, stochastic NPS pollution. 
Woodward points out that, while the most obvious purpose of trading ratios is that 
of equating the impacts of different polluters to insure that an increase in emissions by 
one is at least offset by the other, there are other reasons for employing trading ratios. 
Many trading programs seek to use trading ratios to provide a net environmental benefit, 
in addition to an offset credit and a margin of safety to account for uncertain reduction 
methods (McGinnis). While economists tend to attack the pollution reduction problem as 
12 
a cost minimization problem (minimizing the cost of meeting an environmental quality 
standard), Woodward suggests politicians and other policy makers tend to view the 
problem from the dual perspective - maximizing environmental quality subject to some 
cost constraint that is politically acceptable. Thus, regulators and environmentalists may 
favor use of trading ratios for their potential to create environmental gains beyond the 
requirements of the ambient water quality standards. However, Woodward points out 
that while the cost minimization perspective completely discounts the value of pollution 
reductions below the regulatory standard (which does not necessarily reflect public 
opinion about such reductions), the environmental quality maximization problem ignores 
the market inefficiencies introduced by non-unitary trading ratios. 
Stephenson and Shabman present a system similar to WQT known as a discharger 
association. This type of program design has been implemented in the Tar-Pamlico and 
Neuse River Basins in North Carolina. The discharger association is a group of firms 
which have a collective abatement responsibility assigned by a regulatory agency, but the 
member firms are allowed to allocate the total responsibility among themselves to 
achieve the allowable discharge level at the lowest possible cost. Using this particular 
organizational structure to achieve environmental standards may reduce transactions 
costs, thus allowing a more cost-effective final distribution of abatement responsibilities 
among the member firms. The concept of discharger associations harkens back to 
Coase's "The Nature of the Firm," (1937) wherein he posits that firms exist because it is 
sometimes more cost-effective to coordinate economic activities within one organization 
than it is to deal with transactions costs in the market place. The problem with this 
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particular organizational form, at least for pollution control, is that it does not seem to 
account for the geospatially differential impacts of member firms through any mechanism 
such as a trading ratio. 
Another issue for WQT program design is how to trade NPS loadings for PS 
emissions, given NPS loadings cannot be regularly or accurately measured. Since NPS 
reduction credits for most BMPs can only be estimated based on modeling, a large 
amount of information about land use and agricultural practices surrounding proposed 
BMPs will be required to accurately predict the reduction produced by the 
implementation of a given BMP. For example, if an agricultural producer is using a 
responsible nutrient management plan, installation of a riparian buffer strip on the same 
land would not create the same load reduction that it would if the producer were to 
liberally apply fertilizer up to the very edge of the buff er strip. A given BMP may be 
worth more or less, in terms of nutrient reduction credits, depending on its interaction 
with surrounding land uses and previously implemented BMPs. 
A separate but related issue is the law of unintended consequences; installation of 
one conservation practice may lead to unpredictable changes in production practices 
elsewhere on the farm or on other farms, which may be either beneficial or deleterious to 
environmental quality. Allowing farmers to make money by creating pollution reduction 
credits may provide perverse incentives for farmers who have already implemented best 
management practices. Some might even go so far as to farm land that they otherwise 
would not, just so they could later offer to take the land out of production to create credits 
for which they would be paid by a PS polluter. Establishing historical base loads for NPS 
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polluters based on historical land use patterns is one way to assuage the potential effects 
of perverse incentives, so that runoff-reducing practices implemented prior to a base year 
. . . cannot create tradable credits, and must be maintained if the NPS polluter whishes to 
create tradable credits after the base year. Another means that might decrease the effect 
of perverse incentives for agricultural producers is to require that NPS polluters 
contribute some water quality benefit before they can create any salable discharge credits. 
Versions of both of these policies are included in the trading rules for the Lower Boise 
River Effluent Trading Demonstration Project (Ross & Associates Environmental 
Consulting, Ltd.). 
Best Management Practices 
Best management practices (BMPs) are practices designed to reduce NPS 
loadings. This section will review the literature regarding the effectiveness and cost­
effectiveness of a few BMPs that are often considered viable means of reducing the 
nutrient content in agricultural runoff. 
Lee, Isenhart and Schultz perf onned a study regarding the effectiveness of 
riparian buffer strips in reducing runoff and nutrient content from com and soybeans in 
Iowa. They measured nutrient load reductions effectuated by established multi-species 
riparian buffers composed of switchgrass and switchgrass with woody plants. Such a 
buffer can dam runoff up to 10 cm high. This slowing of the water permits greater time 
for runoff to infiltrate the soil and for some nutrients and sediments to settle out of the 
remaini1:1g runoff. Their results showed that the 23 foot switchgrass buffer removed 95% 
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of the sediment, 80% of the total nitrogen, and 78% of the total Phosphorous. Thus, th'e 
authors show that an established, well-planned riparian buffer can effectively remove 
much of the nutrient content of agricultural runoff. 
Rein found that by establishing perennial vegetative buffer strips, strawberry 
farmers in the Elkhorn Slough watershed of California could derive an estimated net 
benefit of $ 1,488 in the first year and $6, 171 over a five year period. Benefits accrue 
from reduced pesticide and fertilizer use and reduced gully erosion, as well as other 
sources. These results suggest that farmers of certain crops on certain soils would be 
better off establishing buffer strips than not; however, these results will not hold for all 
watersheds and all crops. 
Norwood and Chvosta found that BMPs do not always have their intended 
consequences; in fact, they may sometimes have adverse effects on water quality. Their 
findings are relevant to swine farms in two North Carolina counties, and are based on the 
results of a survey of 85 producers regarding their likely manure-management practices 
in the face of phosphorous-based manure application regulations. Manure contains a 
higher phosphorous to nitrogen ratio than is required for plant growth, but because of the 
cost and difficulty of transporting it, swine farmers tend to over-apply manure on 
cropland or forage surrounding their operations. This leads to phosphorous buildup in the 
soil and water quality problems caused by the associated runoff. The study found that 
many hog producers would clear land adjacent to their existing operations so that they 
would be able to apply based on phosphorous requirements of the soil and crop. This 
being the case, more chemical nitrogen fertilizer would be required for the expanded 
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area, possibly leading to greater nitrogen loadings to surface waters, which could offset 
the reductions in phosphorous loadings. Some respondents to the survey indicated they 
. . . 
would reduce the size of their herd or leave swine production altogether. The results of 
the study indicate that water quality would be improved unambiguously only if hog 
production decreased by 25% or more. Thus, the environmental improvements would be 
due to decreased production, rather than the BMP itself. These results are not necessarily 
applicable in all areas, but they show that regulation of farming practices can have 
unintended and adverse consequences. 
Some Notable WQT Programs 
Several WQT programs have been established in the United States. Some are 
considered successful, while others have not produced the expected results, at least in 
terms of trading activity. Appropriate program design is crucial to the success of tradable 
emissions permit systems; thus, in developing new projects, policy-makers should 
consider what trading rules have previously proved to be conducive to trade. Two 
exemplary WQT projects currently in some stage of implementation are the Tar-Pamlico 
Nutrient Reduction Trading Program (TPNR T) and the Lower Boise River Effluent 
Trading Demonstration Project (LBRET). 
The Tar-Pamlico Nutrient Reduction Trading Program 
The TPNRT Program in North Carolina was established in response to the 1989 
designation of The Tar-Pamlico River Basin as nutrient sensitive waters, with the specific 
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purpose of reducing the over-nitrification of the Pamlico River Estuary (Environomics ). 
PSs in the market function as an association, and have the option of cooperative 
abatement within the association or "trading" with NPSs (by contributing $56/kg/yr to a 
government-operated BMP fund) to meet caps on nitrogen and phosphorous emissions 
(McGinnis). The use of average NPS abatement costs in place of marginal costs to set 
the ''price" ofNPS credits likely eliminates some potential cost savings. However, 
because the BMP funds are distributed to NPS polluters through a government agency, 
the burden of transactions costs is at least partially lifted from both PSs and NPSs. The 
PSs are thus disassociated from any uncertainty inherent in dealing with NPSs; if a PS 
pays for its emissions above the cap it has no further responsibility. Such disassociation 
between buyers and sellers could possibly lead to a situation in which PSs pay for NPS 
emissions reductions that are simply not available (Environomics). As of 1999, however, 
the PS association had been able to stay below its collective nutrient cap through "minor 
capital improvements," "the addition of nutrient removal processes at two of the larger 
plants," and what might be termed PS-PS "trading" (Environomics). Because the PS 
association has been able to comply with its aggregate load allocation, there has been no 
need for payments to the BMP fund to date; however, some very limited PS-NPS 
"trading" has occurred through the purchase and banking for future use ofNPS pollutant 
reduction credits (Woodward and Kaiser, Environomics ). 
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The Lower Boise River Ejjl.uent Trading Demonstration Project 
The LBRET Demonstration Project, a program trading in total phosphorous 
emissions,- was initiated in 1 997 by EPA, Idaho, Oregon and Washington as a pilot 
program to examine "how trading can help improve water quality and lower the overall 
cost of meeting pollutant reduction objectives required by [TMDL] processes" (Ross & 
Associates Environmental Consulting, Ltd.). 
Both PS and NPS polluters in the Lower Boise River can create marketable 
reduction credits; however, one might argue that the market rules discourage some of the 
most potentially beneficial trades, namely PS-NPS trades. For example, trades involving 
NPS polluters must provide a water quality contribution, which is to say that "only part of 
the [NPS] reduction can be available for sale . . .  since the sold portion could be offset by 
a point source increase" (Ross & Associates Environmental Consulting, Ltd.). Thus, 
agricultural producers must abate significantly more than they can sell as certifiable 
credits. The required water quality contribution may be enough to discourage PS-NPS 
trades, especially along with the transaction costs associated with trading. A further 
stipulation of the program guidelines is that "[ n ]onpoint credits will be transferable only 
after the project is installed, installation has been inspected . . . and the reductions have 
been verified through monitoring and established by submitting the Reduction Credit 
Certificate" (Ross & Associates Environmental Consulting, Ltd.). Potential participants 
would not likely want to pay in advance for the installation of a BMP only to find that the 
practice did not create the estimated reduction credit along with the required water 
quality contribution. On the other hand, the year for calculating the baseline pollutant 
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loadings for NPSs in the lower Boise is 1996, so any BMP installed between 1996 and 
the present may generate salable credits (Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, 
2004). Yet, NPS reductions that are calculated based on models, rather than directly 
measured, are reduced in value by an uncertainty discount multiplier to account for the 
variability in effectiveness of the BMP (Ross & Associates Environmental Consulting, 
Ltd.). Such program rules regarding NPSs may be the primary reason for the lack of 
trading activity in the Lower Boise River, as they reduce the cost-efficiency that could be 
gained through PS-NPS trading. The v�lue of each of these restrictions could be argued 
based on criteria such as equity (i.e., PSs should not be responsible for all reduction, 
hence the required NPS water quality contribution) and water quality protection; 
however, their combinatory effect may be prohibitive to PS-NPS trading. According to 
Craig Shepard, of the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, no trades have been 
completed in the program area to date (Personal communication December 9, 2005), 
despite the development of a TMDL for Snake River-Hells Canyon in 2002, which had 




An Assessment of Potential Water Quality Trading Markets in Tennessee 
Introduction 
Working within the current regulatory structure of the CW A, offset trading, 
wherein PSs under regulatory pressure to reduce discharges purchase offset credits from 
agricultural NPSs, could significantly reduce the costs of attaining a predetermined level 
of ambient quality. However, such a PS-NPS WQT program would not be suitable to all 
areas, nor to all water quality issues. Trading the abatement responsibility for toxic 
substances, for example, has the potential to concentrate toxic substances in the 
environment around high cost abaters, and substantially increase health and 
environmental risk. Distinct areas with differing water quality issues will require 
individualized solutions. The purpose of this study is to rank different watershed areas in 
Tennessee according to their suitability for PS-NPS WQT as a low-cost solution to the 
attainment of environmental goals established by federal and state regulatory agencies. 
Hypothetically, a ranking system that incorporates an index of physical and theoretical 
economic relationships between NPS and PS polluters and the water quality impairments 
to which they contribute should identify some areas as being particularly suitable for the 
offset type WQT proposed by EPA. This study will identify and rank potentially viable 
trading areas based on a series of hurdles and criteria designed to eliminate areas that 
cannot support trading, and predict the suitability of trading as a solution to the water 
quality problems in the remaining areas. 
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Defining the Potential Market Areas 
The market areas under study are commonly called watersheds, which are land 
areas that drain all water that falls within them to a common point, at which the water 
flows out of the watershed. Watershed boundaries follow topographical boundaries, such 
as ridge lines. By this definition, each individual stream or portion thereof might be said 
to have it own watershed, or drainage area. A hydrologic unit code (HUC) is a drainage 
basin of one size or another, as indicated by the number of digits in its numeric code. 
Successively smaller HUCs (which have successively longer numeric codes) are nested 
within larger a HUC, so that the smaller HUCs flow to a central point within the larger 
HUC. The largest drainage areas analyzed in this research are the eight-digit HUCs, 
which are often simply called watersheds. Nested within these watersheds are their 
subcomponent 12-digit HUCs, which all eventually contribute to the outflow from the 
watershed in which they lie. 
The Ranking Criteria 
The number of river and stream miles not meeting the ambient water quality 
standards to support their designated uses, hereafter referred to simply as "impaired 
meters," is used both as a filter and as a ranking criterion for the purposes ofWQT 
suitability assessment. In a watershed where no impaired meters are attributed to a given 
pollutant, there is no need to further reduce discharges of that pollutant. Since the EPA's 
guidelines and the CW A do not allow increased PS discharges above the permitted level 
in exchange for the purchase of credits, PSs in a watershed devoid of tradable 
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impairments would have no economic incentive to purchase credits. As impaired meters 
become more extensive, the need to reduce emissions of the contributory pollutant 
becomes spatially (and probably quantitatively) more extensive, thus making WQT a 
more viable solution. 
Market participants are a must for WQT to work, and the geospatially weighted 
emissions of polluters of different types are critical variables in ranking the suitability of 
a given watershed as a trading area. If no regulated PSs exist in an impaired watershed, 
there will be no increased regulatory pressure to spur the purchase of credits from 
agricultural NPSs. The solution to such problems will lie entirely in the hands of NPS 
polluters. On the other hand, in watersheds where very little agricultural activity takes 
place and PS emissions are almost entirely responsible for the impairment, demand for 
NPS reductions may exceed supply. Furthermore, polluters more distant from an 
impairment have increasingly negligible impacts on the impairment. Thus, it is desirable 
to have some range of balance between the geospatially weighted PS and NPS emissions 
affecting impaired waterways. This balance need not be exactly one to one, but it should 
be such that the full amount of required abatement could be accomplished ( at least in 
theory) by either group of polluters. This condition not only increases the likelihood that 
supply will meet demand (and vice versa) but also improves the political palatability for 
PSs by limiting their liability to an amount no greater than their discharge. However, 
data indicating the necessary pollutant load reductions to meet ambient standards in 
specific watersheds is not available, so, as a proxy for this measure, we use the ratio of 
the emissions of one polluter group to the emissions of the other group. The closer the 
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ratio is to one, the more likely PSs could purchase all necessary reductions from 
agricultural NPSs. 
Six hurdles, based on the above discussion, will be used to· narrow the target of 
study by eliminating areas that are definitely unsuitable for WQT. The first three are 
applied on the eight-digit HUC level to eliminate all watersheds that are unsuitable for 
WQT. Then hurdles four through six (which are consecutively analogous to hurdles one 
through three) are applied on the 12-digit HUC level to eliminate all unsuitable sub­
watershed areas within the watershed areas that passed the first three hurdles. Hurdles 
five and six are applied to aggregations of remaining 12-digit HU Cs all within the same 
eight-digit HUC and are linked to each other by the directional flow of water. A list of 
the hurdles follows. 
1. Presence oftradable impaired meters in eight-digit HUC 
(tradable impaired meters > 0) 
2. Presence of PS polluters in eight-digit HUC (tradable PS discharge > 0) 
3. Presence of Agricultural NPS polluters in eight-digit HUC (acres of 
agricultural land use > 0) 
4. Contribution to tradable impairments from the 12-digit HUC (tradable 
impairments affected by a 12-digit HUC within its eight-digit HUC > 0) 
5. Presence of PS polluters in flow-linked aggregations of remaining 12-digit 
HUCs within the same 8-digit HUC (tradable PS discharge > 0) 
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6. Presence of Agricultural NPS polluters in flow-linked aggregations of 
remaining 12-digit HUCs within the same 8-digit HUC (acres of 
agricultural land use > 0) 
The above hurdles restrict the areas under consideration to flow-linked areas containing 
impairments and potential PS and agricultural NPS trading partners. Having thus 
restricted the set of watersheds and portions of watersheds under study, the next step is to 
rank the remaining areas that could potentially support a WQT program based on 
thefollowing criteria, which are analogous to the hurdles used to find the set of potential 
trading areas, with the exception of criteria 4. 
1. Extent of tradable impaired meters 
2. Distance-discounted PS contribution to tradable impairments 
3. Distance-discounted NPS contribution to tradable impairments 
4. Balance between criteria 2 and 3 
While this list is not a comprehensive list of variables that might affect the 
suitability of an area for WQT, it does provide insights into the basic physical criteria that 
would predict a strong market. For example, established, active watershed organizations 
may also have an effect on the political feasibility of a WQT program; however, their 
potential effect is somewhat unpredictable, since they might choose either to legally 
oppose the trading system or to facilitate transactions in the new market. To assess the 
potential impacts of such human variables as watershed organizations and public opinion 
would necessitate an extensive information-gathering effort through surveys of 
organizations and individuals. Such an effort would be costly and premature without first 
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ranking potential WQT markets based solely on physical properties as affected by the 
current legal framework. 
Data & Methodology 
The most general set of watersheds under consideration was comprised of all 
eight-digit HUCs that are either partially or completely contained by the Tennessee state 
boundary. Locations of these watersheds relative to the state border were determined by 
overlaying eight-digit HUC boundaries and state borders in ArcMap to begin the creation 
of a geospatial information system (GIS). Only the portions of these watersheds that are 
within the Tennessee boundary were considered, since the effect of involving regulatory 
agencies and other stakeholders from multiple states is likely to drastically increase the 
administrative and transactions costs of a WQT program. The geospatial data used in this 
step may be viewed at and extracted from the National Hydrography Dataset (NHD) 
Geodatabase5, which incorporates information of various types from the US Geological 
Survey and US EPA. 
Application of the first hurdle to the eight-digit HU Cs eliminates those that 
contain no impairments attributed to nutrients, organic enrichment, or low dissolved 
oxygen (hereafter referred to as "tradable impairments'l The presence of such 
impairments was determined through the use of the final version of Tennessee's 2002 
303( d) List (Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation), which lists by 
eight-digit HUC all impaired water bodies in the state, along with their respective causes. 
5 Available: http://nhdgeo.usgs.gov/viewer.htm 
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A geospatial shape file representing the 303( d) listed impairments was then obtained 
from EPA' s Watershed Assessment, Tracking & Results (WATERS) data downloads6 
. .. . .. and added to the GIS to find the exact locations of the impairments within the eight-digit 
HUCs. 
Next, eight-digit HUCs containing no PS polluters with nitrogen limits were 
eliminated through the initial application of the second hurdle. This hurdle eliminates 
those watersheds that have no potential buyers of nitrogen credits. PS data were obtained 
using EPA' s Permit Compliance System (PCS) 7 customized query engine, which 
provides downloads of locational and discharge information for PSs in Tennessee that 
emit nitrogen. The download provided coordinates for most sources that had discharge 
limits for nitrogen; however, the coordinates provided were often in direct conflict with 
other locational information, such as the eight-digit HU C listed in the PCS data. In 
instances where such a conflict existed ( or when no coordinates were reported), the 
coordinates were either verified or corrected using street addresses to locate each 
potentially contributing PS in its proper 12-digit HUC. 
Use of the third hurdle eliminates eight-digit HU Cs that contain no agricultural 
NPS polluters, which would be the potential sellers of nitrogen credits. The land use data 
for this study came from the 1992 National Land Cover Dataset (NLCD)8, and can be 
viewed and downloaded from the USGS Seamless Data Distribution page. This dataset 
was used to locate agricultural activities within their eight- and 12-digit HUCs. Areas 
6 Available: http://www.epa.gov/waters/data/downloads.html 
7 Available: http://www.epa.gov/enviro/htmVpcs/adhoc.html 
8 Available: http://seamless.usgs.gov/website/seamless/viewer.php 27 
that do not pass this hurdle could not, in theory, host viable PS-NPS WQT markets 
involving agricultural NPSs. 
The remaining eight-digit HUCs were then subdivided into their sub-component 
12-digit HUCs. Doing so allows us to account for the directional flow of water and the 
approximate distance between every source and the impairment( s) to which it contributes. 
The 12-digit HU Cs, for the purposes of this study, are afforded a status similar to that of 
the zones described by Hung and Shaw. Also, this step seemed appropriate since US 
EPA and the state environmental agencies break eight-digit HUCs into their sub­
component 12-digit HUCs for the purposes of creating TMDLs. 12-digit HUC 
boundaries are available for download through the U.S. Department of Agriculture's 
Natural Resources Conservation Service Geospatial Data Gateway9 • Next, the fourth 
hurdle, based on contribution to downstream tradable impairments within the same eight­
digit HUC, was applied to the sub-component 12-digit HUCs. Where downstream 
impairments did not exist, those 12-digit HUCs were considered non-contributors to 
water quality problems, and were eliminated from consideration. This simply means that 
polluters that do not contribute to impairments within their eight-digit HUCs will not be 
considered viable trading partners. The remaining 12-digit HUCs were then combined to 
create sets of 12-digit HUCs, or "impairment zones," that contribute to the saine 
impairment(s). Contributor status was determined for each 12-digit HUC based on 
directional flow information from the NHD Geodatabase in conjunction with the 
boundaries of eight- and 12-digit HUCs. There was sometimes more than one 
"impairment zone" within an eight-digit HUC. 
9 Available: http://datagateway.nrcs.usda.gov/NextPage.asp 
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These "impairment zones" were then subjected to the fifth and sixth hurdles. 
Doing so eliminates unsuitable portions of the eight-digit HU Cs from consideration. 
.. .. .. .. Those zones that contain no PS polluters or no NPS polluters cannot be considered viable 
markets, since no trading partners would be present. 
PS discharge limits from the PCS data were used as a proxy for actual emissions 
because these limits are based on the design flow and technological regulatory 
requirements at the facilities; therefore, the limits should be nearly the same as the 
discharges. Furthermore, PSs with discharge limits are likely to be the only purchasers of 
pollution credits. The discharge limits, given in pounds per day, were annualized and 
summed for each 12-digit HUC, using the formula: 
Di = Ldj * 365 
jz=l 
Where: 
D; is total annual PS discharge within 12-digit HUC i, 
� is the average daily discharge from PS polluter j, and 
n is the set of all PS polluters in 12-digit HUC i. 
Approximate NPS nitrogen loads were derived from a combination of land use data and 
nitrogen emissions factors for different land use types as located by the NLCD, which 
divides Tennessee's agricultural lands into two major types: pasture/hay and row crops. 
The acreages of different land use types were multiplied by their emissions factors (23.2 
lb/ac/yr and 5.53 lb/ac/yr for row crops and pasture, respectively), as determined by 
Bhaduri, et al., for each 12-digit HUC. Use of the formula below returns the NPS 
loadings for a 12-digit HUC: 
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Li = f (H1 * 5 . 53 }+ f (zk * 23 .2 ) 
/=I k=l 
Where: 
L; is total annual NPS nitrogen loading for 12-digit HU C i, 
Hj is the acreage of pasture featurej, 
n is all pasture features inl2-digit HUC i, 
Zk is the acreage of row crop feature k, and 
m is all row crop features in 12-digit HUC i. 
To obtain raw, discounted NPS and PS scores for each of the 12-digit areas, the 
downstream impaired meters were multiplied by a discount factor that is a function of the 
number of 12-digit HUCs between the source HUC and the impairments to which it 
contributes. These scores were calculated by multiplying the NPS and PS discharges by 
the sum of the discounted downstream impaired meters to which they contribute as 
follows: 
Where: 
N;, P;, L; and D; are respectively the NPS score, PS score, NPS loadings, and PS 
discharges for 12-digit HUC i, 
� is the length (in meters) of impairmentj, 
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Xu is two plus the number of 12-digit HUCs intervening between 12-digit HUC i 
and impairmentj, when impairmentj is not within 12-digit HUC i, and is equal to 
one when impairmentj is within HUC i, and 
n is the number of impairments to which the discharges 12-digit HUC i 
contribute. 
Discounting discharges by distance is appropriate for pollutants such as nitrogen because 
it dissipates during in-stream transport, making more distant impacts relatively smaller 
than impacts close to the source (Hung and Shaw). The result of the above process is a 
distance-weighted PS and NPS emissions contribution score for each individual 12-digit 
HUC. 
After developing NPS and PS emissions scores for each 12-digit HUC using the 
above methodology, the scores were aggregated up to the "impairment zone" level. Each 
zone was assigned an NPS and a PS score, which are equal to the sums of the respective 
scores for each of its sub-component, 12-digit HU Cs 
Thus, criteria five through six listed in the previous section were subsumed into two 
factors (PS and NPS scores) to be used in developing a comparison between different 
potential trading areas. 
Balance between PS and NPS emissions is the third factor to be used in 
developing the ranking system. To obtain a measure of this balance, the smaller of the 
NPS and PS scores for each potential trading area was divided by the larger, which 
returns a polluter ratio (R) between zero and one. This ratio was used to discount for the 
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possibility that emissions from one type of polluter might not be substantial enough to 
make PS-NPS trading feasible. 
NPS and PS scores, as well as polluter ratios for each potential trading area were 
then combined in a Cobb-Douglas function designed to predict an area's suitability for 
WQT. The function follows: 
Where: 
Sj is the potential trading areaj's predicted WQT suitability score, 
llj is the NPS score trading area j, 
Pi is the PS score for trading area j, 
Ri is the ratio of the smaller score to the larger for trading areaj, and 
a, b, and c are weights that sum to 1. 
The output of the function was a composite WQT suitability score (which was then 
normalized between zero and 1) for each potential trading area. These scores can be 
compared across the potential areas to identify areas most likely to find that PS-NPS 
WQT could be part of an appropriate solution for their impairment problems. 
The Cobb-Douglas functional form was chosen because of its constant returns to 
scale assumption and its flexibility. The exponents can be altered to reflect various 
policy choices. For example, if one desired to rank these watersheds with an NPS:PS 
trading ratio of 1: 1, the exponents a and b should be equal to each other, and equal to the 
exponent c by default. However, if the trading ratio is to be 2: 1, the exponent of the NPS 
score should be twice that of the PS score ( a=2b ), making the NPS score worth more in 
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the final ranking. Accounting for trading ratios in the function will change the meaning 
and importance of the ranking criterion Rj. Specifically, Rj might more appropriately 
equal the ratio ]½: P; when the trading ratio is not equal to one. The exponent c would 
then be forced to equal the lesser of the exponents a and b if retention of constant returns 
to scale is desirable. Furthermore, the ratio would no longer be constrained between zero 
and one, since importance would be placed on which sources were discharging more of 
the pollutant. It is possible that N°:Pb ratios greater than or equal to one would all be 
equally desirable. Note that as the proposed trading ratio increases, the weight of R 
decreases. 
Results 
Tennessee includes portions of 56 eight-digit HU Cs. Only portions of these 
watersheds within the Tennessee boundary were considered (Figure 3. 1 ). After applying 
the first hurdle based on the presence of tradable impairments, 42 eight-digit HU Cs or 
portions thereofremain for consideration (Figure 3.2). Application of the PS polluter 
hurdle to the 42 eight-digit HUCs eliminates another five watersheds from consideration, 
leaving 37 for further analysis (Figure 3.3). The NPS hurdle is not binding, since all 
remaining eight-digit HU Cs contain some level of agricultural production, as shown by 
the land use data. 
For the next stage of analysis, the remaining eight digit HU Cs were disaggregated 
to their 934 subcomponent 12-digit HU Cs. Application of the fourth hurdle eliminates 
those 12-digit HUCs neither containing nor contributing to a downstream tradable 
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-- Tradabl e lr'Tl)a irments 
D Tennessee Border 
Remaining Portions of Eight-Digit HUCs 
Figure 3.2 :  Eight-Digit HU Cs Remaining after Application of the First Hurdle 
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Legend 
• Nitrogen-limited PSs 
-- Tradable lni:iairments 
D Tennessee Border 
Remaining Portions of Eight-Digit HUCs 
Figure 3.3: Eight-Digit HU Cs Remaining after Application of the Second Hurdle 
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impairment, resulting in a set of 318 12-digit HUCs for further analysis. These 318 12-
digit HU Cs were then grouped into 103 "impairment zones" within the 3 7 remaining 
. . eight-digit HUCs (Figure 3.4). Note that several of the "impairment zones" share 
boundaries, and it is possible that there may be flow linkages between some of them; 
thus, the eight-digit HUC boundary may not be the most logical cutoff point for the 
boundary of an impairment zone. However, eight-digit boundaries were used because of 
US EPA's guidance. At this point, the fifth hurdle was applied to these zones to 
eliminate those that contain no PS presence. The sixth hurdle was not binding, as all 
remaining 12-digit HUCs had some agricultural production. The impairment zones were 
thus whittled down to 45 potential trading areas, consisting of 239 12-digit HU Cs 
collectively (Figure 3.5). The Red River watershed example in Figure 3.6 provides an 
example of what an eight-digit HUC that crosses the state border might look like after 
application of hurdles one through six. Note that only 12-digit HUCs within Tennessee 
are included in the analysis, and that this watershed has two potential trading areas. 
Following the steps outlined in the methodology section produces PS and NPS 
scores, as well as polluter ratios for all 239 12-digit HUCs under consideration. The 
three ranking factors were then summed across each potential trading area to produce 
aggregate scores for all 45 of them. Potential trading area PS and NPS scores were then 
entered into the Cobb-Douglas function to produce WQT suitability scores. 
The output of the process provides normalized scores for 45 potential trading areas in 
Tennessee, which are plotted by score and rank in Figure 3.7. Scores for the top three 
ranked potential WQT areas are between 1.00 and 0.88, and represent the entirety or a 
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Figure 3.4: Tennessee's 103 Impairment Zones 
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Figure 3.5: Tennessee's 45 Potential Trading Areas 
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portion of the South Fork Forked Deer, Stones, and North Fork Forked Deer River 
Watersheds (Figure 3.8), which do not have established TMDLs for nutrients, low 
dissolved oxygen, or organic enrichment. After· this point the scores drop to around 0.4 7. 
Eleven of the potential trading areas have score between 0.47 and 0.20, after which point 
the scores fall steadily to 0.00015. The mean of all scores is approximately 0. 18 with a 
standard deviation of 0.236. 
Using the Cobb-Douglas formula, of course, is not the only potential way 
of ranking or rating these identified potential trading areas. For example, one could use 
some multi-objective ranking or rating scheme to compare the areas based on the PS and 
NPS contribution to the tradable impairments. There are also other factors that are 
correlated with the WQT suitability score. For example, the acreage of the potential 
trading area and its suitability score have a positive correlation of 0. 722, which makes 
sense because larger areas are likely to contain more tradable impairments, more 
contributing PS polluters, and more contributing NPS polluters. Table 3. 1 presents each 
trading area, listed by some portion of its respective eight-digit HUC, with its associated 
raw scores for each of the ranking criteria, as well as the areas' associated acreages. 
Table 3.2 presents the same scores converted into rankings for each watershed. Both 
tables are included because 3 . 1  shows the relative differences between the scores of 
different trading areas, while Table 3.2 more effectively illustrates the relationship 
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Table 3.1 : Tradin Areas Listed b Scores 
Trading Area Overall Raw NPS Raw PS Balance Acreage 
Raw Score Score Score 
08010205 4540970 37500435608 9676604700 0.2580 481600 
05 130203 4084195 1 845 1634505 82539 1 1305 0.4473 600400 
08010204 4005445 79157174093 8016342447 0. 10 13  97920 
06010102 2146959 3462213816  3 145833648 0.9086 289500 
05 130108 1964290 9 1 75887405 2753015580 0.3000 934000 
06010108.08 1775624 28129628226 2366065620 0.0841 1 70800 
06010207.03 1585659 33852 1 1 393 1996709220 0.5898 57850 
06010104 1364263 40309082767 1 593482379 0.0395 503500 
05 130206 1 327279 43252023454 1 529126908 0.0354 372500 
06030005 1269306 12940934308 1430044488 0. 1 105 23 1000 
06040003.0201 1096725 26202801 88 1 148541912 0.4383 32400 
05 130204 1087628 463545 16 180 1 1 34282240 0.0245 288200 
06020002. 12 1081045 1 123998871 1443 173760 0.7788 448 10  
06030003.0305 9 18998 2789194746 880992900 0.3 1 59 26820 
08010208.07 726455 7228 134072 6 19 174800 0.0857 55690 
05 130202.0103 530693 386602885 365 12937000 0.0 106 30550 
05 1 30204.06 499985 2375932200 353538000 0. 1488 6 1690 
06010207.0503 465644 3 17747418  2576673000 0. 1233 19050 
06020001 . 1 102 445979 297832477 5815563 1 560 0.005 1 39620 
06030003 435463 6821564602 287360640 0.042 1 197 100 
06040005 .0403 408733 1 009585786 261 3 12480 0.2588 24650 
06010201 .0503 397608 540285327 250716960 0.4640 23570 
06040003 .03 385264 52 10698347 239132565 0.0459 82330 
06040002.0601 359454 2587842020 2 15509500 0.0833 42710  
05 130202.0105 34535 1  20295 1 13 1  3943246320 0.05 1 5  40950 
06040005.06 337698 1 176 1 1 36609 196242750 0.0 167 93 100 
05 130106 328570 2148746562 1 88339940 0.0877 45340 
08010203 .0101  288794 1 3 13 177273 1 55 197080 0. 1 1 82 47930 
05 1 10002.0105 262797 726359409 1 34720208 0. 1 855 1 1 680 
06030003 .0701 258993 3 1 701 55524 1 3 1 805216  0.0416  35100 
06010108. 0508 239945 16698 1 1969 1 17535410 0.0704 21010 
05 130105 1 83730 1 863507747 78753870 0.0423 504200 
05 130108.0807 1 82091 27 13360649 77702328 0.0286 28790 
06040004.0104 1 53497 547961485 60138468 0. 1097 23710  
05 130201 .0201 1 52724 5229288499 59684526 0.0 1 14 42730 
05 130104 141098 173009 16 1 53001000 0.3063 17390 
08010203.0102 120145 1325252629 4 1644800 0.03 14 33590 
06010205 . 1 104 105439 103559366 34237800 0.3306 45 190 
06010208.0405 93836 2 19 18401 1 28744686 0. 1 3 1 1  39700 
06010206.0404 93401 269815476 28544886 0. 1058 1 1680 
05 130204.0303 90964 1 14238891 27435240 0.2402 17610  
06040003.0507 69223 5 13021723 . 1 82 13 120 0.0355 26960 
05 1 10002.0503 58483 584255578 14 143410  0.0242 10610  
08010209.01 10646 5419980370 1098504 0.0002 33580 
05 130206.07 666 1036409754 17203 0.0000 82610  
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Trading Area Overall NPS PS Balance Acreage 
Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank 
080 1 0205 1 5 3 1 2  5 
05 1 30203 2 7 4 5 2 
080 1 0204 3 1 5 22 1 2  
060 1 0 1 02 4 1 6  7 1 7 
05 1 30 1 08 5 1 0  8 1 0  1 
060 1 0 1 08 .08 6 6 1 0  25 1 1  
060 1 0207 .03 7 1 7  1 1  3 1 7  
060 1 0 1 04 8 4 1 2  33 4 
05 1 30206 9 3 1 3  35 6 
06030005 1 0  8 1 5  1 9  9 
06040003 .020 1 1 1  2 1  1 6  6 3 1  
05 130204 1 2  2 1 7  38 8 
06020002. 12 1 3  29 1 4  2 22 
06030003.0305 14  1 9  1 8  8 35 
080 1 0208.07 1 5  1 1  1 9  24 1 8  
05 1 30202.0 1 03 1 6  37 2 42 32 
05 1 30204.06 1 7  23 20 1 5  1 6  
060 1 0207.0503 1 8  38 9 1 7  40 
0602000 1 . 1 1 02 1 9  39 1 43 27 
06030003 20 1 2  2 1  3 1  1 0  
06040005.0403 2 1  3 1  22 1 1  36 
060 1 020 1 .0503 22 35 23 4 38 
06040003 .03 23 1 5  24 29 1 5  
06040002.060 1 24 22 25 26 24 
05 1 30202.0 1 05 25 42 6 28 25 
06040005 .06 26 9 26 40 1 3  
05 1 30 1 06 27 24 27 23 20 
080 1 0203 .0 1 0 1  2 8  28 28 1 8  1 9  
05 1 1 0002.0 1 05 29 32 29 14 43 
06030003.0701 30 1 8  30 32 28 
060 1 0 1 08.0508 3 1  26 3 1  27 39 
05 1 30 1 05 32 25 32 30 3 
05 1 30 1 08.0807 33 20 33 37 33 
06040004.0 1 04 34 34 34 20 37 
05 1 3020 1 .020 1  3 5  14  35  4 1  23 
05 1 30 1 04 36 43 36 9 42 
080 10203 .0 1 02 37 27 37 36 29 
060 1 0205 . 1 1 04 38 45 38 7 2 1  
060 1 0208.0405 39 4 1  39 1 6  26 
060 1 0206. 0404 40 40 40 2 1  44 
05 1 30204.0303 4 1  44 4 1  1 3  4 1  
06040003 .0507 42 36 42 34 34 
05 1 1 0002.0503 43 33 43 39 45 
080 1 0209.0 1 44 1 3  44 44 30 
05 130206.07 45 30 45 45 14  
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Conclusions 
Since the scores only provide a relative ranking, the potential of any of the WQT 
areas under study to actually support a viab.le WQT program is unknown. However, it 
may be asserted that areas with higher scores are more suitable for WQT than areas with 
lower scores. Ideally, a threshold score would be identified that would signify the 
viability of a potential market area. Such a threshold value could, in theory, be identified 
by comparing the scores of Tennessee's watersheds with scores for other areas that are 
known supporters of viable markets, such as the various WQT pilot programs that have 
met with differing degrees of success. Another potential way to discover a feasibility 
threshold might be to calculate the potential abatement cost savings in each ranked 
Tennessee watershed. Much could be learned about the threshold by performing a cost 
savings calculation for a strategically chosen watershed, somewhere in the middle of the 
ranking. Such an analysis could be performed where the required reductions to meet 
ambient environmental standards are known ( or have been estimated by some regulatory 
agency), as would be the case in a watershed with a TMDL for nitrogen. 
Theoretically, these scores should also be positively correlated with the potential 
abatement cost savings for each of the possible trading areas, since the ranking process 
was designed to rank the watershed areas based on their relative potential benefits from 
tradable abatement responsibilities. Intuitively, then, watershed areas with higher scores 
are likely to produce greater trading activity because they will likely contain more 
polluters with varying cost structures, so that their marginal costs of abatement may be 
equalized at positive discharge levels. 
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Chapter IV 
Assessing the Cost ofNPS Technology-Based Regulation 
Introduction 
Since the passage of the CW A, largely unregulated NPS pollution contributes to 
an increasing share of the nation's water quality problems. While the amount of 
agricultural land in the United States has remained relatively constant over the past 30 
years, agricultural production has increased as a result of technological advances and 
increasingly fertilizer-intensive agricultural practices, which have have been a major 
contributor to a three-fold increase nitrate load from the Mississippi River to the Gulf of 
Mexico (Greenhalgh and Sauer). When the states and territories performed a recent 
survey of the nation's waters, they found that 39% of the waters assessed were impaired 
for one or more uses, and EPA posits that the largest single contributor to water quality 
impairments is NPS runoff from agricultural lands (US Environmental Protection Agency 
Office of Water, 2002). One potential means of ameliorating the adverse effects of 
modem agricultural practices would be to impose a technology-based regulation on all 
agricultural producers by requiring implementation of some basic BMP to protect water 
quality. 
This paper is an attempt to quantify the costs of implementing a regulation that 
requires that all agricultural producers create grass buff er areas of approximately 1 50 feet 
between agricultural production activities and riparian features in the Harpeth River 
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with regard to WQT because the supply of riparian buff er strips will bear some 
proportional relationship to the supply of agricultural NPS nutrient emissions reduction 
. . . credits. Of course, individual buffer strips will have differential environmental impacts 
determined by, among other things, the rate of soil loss, the fertility of the soil, their 
relative proximities to water quality impairments, and the land uses and practices 
surrounding the buffer area. 
Overview of Project Area 
The Harpeth River watershed is located to the west and southwest of Nashville in 
Middle Tennessee, encompassing parts of Cheatham, Davidson, Dickson, and 
Williamson Counties (Figure 4. 1 ). The watershed drains 867 square miles through 
approximately 1,364 miles of streams before eventually emptying into the Cumberland 
River (US Environmental Protection Agency Region 4). The most recent land use data 
for the watershed is from the 1990- 1993 Multi-Resolution Land Characteristic 
Consortium, in the form of the 1992 National Land Cover Database (NLCD). Although 
land use changes have certainly occurred in this rapidly-developing watershed over the 
last decade, all land use data in this paper will be derived from the 1992 NLCD. At that 
time, approximately 24.2%, orl 79,335 acres, were in agricultural use. Pasture/hay 
accounted for 130,294 of these acres, while row crops covered the remaining 49,041. 
The Harpeth River watershed was chosen for this project because it not only has streams 
that are impaired due to "Organic Enrichment/Low DO", but more importantly, because 
it is the only watershed in the state of Tennessee with a finalized TMDL for this nutrient-
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related impairment (US Environmental Protection Agency Region 4). The importance of 
the TMDL lies in the detailed information on sources of nutrients within the watershed 
and the effects of these nutrients on water quality. 
Data & Methodology 
To start, the 1 992 NLCD was clipped in ArcMap to the area of the Harpeth River 
Watershed. The next step was to isolate agricultural land uses from other land uses. In 
the watershed, the NLCD only shows two classifications of agricultural land use, namely 
"row crops" and "pasture/hay." Once these lands were located and isolated, they were 
clipped based on proximity to riparian features shown in the NHD for the watershed. 
This process was accomplished by creating a 150 foot buffer in ArcMap around all 
riparian features, and then clipping the land use features to this buffer. ArcMap was then 
used to calculate the acreage of each of these patches of agricultural land within the 
buffer area. These patches were deemed to be the land put to use in buffer activities 
under a potential regulatory program. 
Cropland was valued at its opportunity cost, which was determined based on both 
cropping practices and soil fertility. The most recent county crop acreage data from the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture National Agricultural Statistics Service10  were used to 
estimate the crop composition in each county. The most current data available were 
generally for the year 2004; however, the most recent soybean data available for 
Davidson and Dickson counties were from 2001 and 2002, respectively. Com acreage 
for the purposes of this study was the sum of the com for grain acreage from the 
10Available: http://www.nass.usda.gov/nass/pubs/histdata 
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aforementioned datasets and the corn for silage acreage listed for each county in the 2002 
census of agriculture, since no more recent data for silage was available. 
The State Soil Geographic (STATSGO) Database 1 1 , � product of the US 
Department of Agriculture Natural Resources Conservation Service, serves as the 
measure of soil fertility for this study. The dataset divides the area into mapping units, or 
areas with similar soil patterns and compositions, and also provides the proportions of the 
mapping units' constituent soils. Further, the data provide estimated per acre yields for 
each crop and soil type combination. A weighted average yield was obtained for each 
crop and mapping unit by multiplying the yield for a given soil type by the soil's 
proportion within the mapping unit divided by the sum of the proportions of all soil types 
where the crop was grown, then summing these products for each crop. The above 
process is summarized by the following equation: 
Where: 
¥;j is the weighted average yield for crop i in a mapping unit j, 
Y;k is the STATSGO yield for crop i on soil type k, 
Pjk is the proportion of mapping unit j covered by soil type k, and 
m is the total number of soil types on which crop i is grown in soil mapping unit j. 
Each crop then had a weighted average yield for each mapping unit. These weighted 
averages are assumed to be 1 994 yields, as the metadata for the ST ATSGO database 
indicate that the data are current as of their publication date ( 1994 ). As a result, the yields 
1 1  Available: http://www.ncgc.nrcs.usda.gov/products/datasets/statsgo/index.html 51  
needed to be inflated to current yields to reflect advances in production technology, as 
well as the interaction of these advances with the changing resource base in each county, 
over the last decade. 
An appropriate yield inflator would be the expected 2004 yield divided by the 
expected 1994 yield for each county and crop. Using expected yields is more appropriate 
than using actual yields because actual yields may not reveal the same yield response to 
technological change, since other factors, such as drought, may affect yields in any given 
year. Furthermore, producers make decisions based on expectations, rather than actual 
yields. County level data (as opposed to national data) was used for the creation of the 
yield inflators in order to account for some of the regional variations and changing land 
use patterns unique to the area of study. To find predicted yields, time periods were first 
regressed on actual yields from the NASS downloads for each crop in each county to 
estimate the values of the parameters of the equation: 
Where: 
Yift is the actual yield for crop i in county /in time period t, 
a & P are parameters to be estimated by an ordinary least squares regression 
relating time period to yield, and 
t is the time period (t19s7 = 1, . . . , !2004 = 18). 
The estimated parameters (a· and p•) for each crop in each county were then used to 
predict yields for 12004 and 11994 using the equation: 
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Where: 
Yift is the predicted yield for crop i in county fin time period t, 
a· & l are parameters e·stimated by the preceding ·ordinary least squares 
regressions for all crops and counties, and 
t is the time period for which the yield is predicted. 
The resulting regression equations and yield inflators are presented in Table 4. 1 .  Note 
that the estimated p coefficients for some crops in some counties are negative, which may 
be attributed to the changing resource base in those counties that are rapidly urbanizing. 
The yield inflators (lif = Yif2ooJYif1994) were multiplied by the weighted average 1994 
yields from the ST A TSGO data that appertained to the respective counties and crop types 
for each potential buffer feature, producing a weighted average expected current yield for 
each crop on each buffer by mapping unit and county. These weighted average current 
expected yields for each crop on each buffer feature by county and soil mapping unit 
were produced using the formula below: 
Y w = I if *¥-ij 
Where: 
Y;..i is the weighted average current expected yield for crop i in mapping unitj in 
county f, 
Ji/ is the yield inflator for crop i in county f, and 
¥;i is the 1994 weighted average expected yield for crop i in soil mapping unitj. 
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Table 4.1 : Estimated Regressions and Yield Inflators 
County Crop Equation Yield Inflator (/;fl 
Cheatham Com y ift = 62.52 + 3.428 t 1.381 
Davidson Com _y ift = 66. 19 + 2.502 t 1.290 
Dickson Com y = 62.739 + 2.811/ 1.330 ift 
Hickman Com y ift = 81.33 + 1.697 t 1. 179 
Rutherford Com y = 61.425 + 3. 107/ 1.360 ift 
Williamson Com y ift = 73.98 + 2.897 t 1.298 
Cheatham Soybeans y fti = 28.948 + 0.423 t 1.131 
Davidson Soybeans _y = 27.431- 0. 141/ 0.947 ift 
Dickson Soybeans y ift = 23.562 + 0.394 t 1. 148 
Hickman Soybeans y ift = 23.614 + 0.696 t 1.238 
Rutherford Soybeans y = 21.340 + 0.777 t 1.282 ift 
Williamson Soybeans _y ift = 25.353 + 0.577 f 1. 193 
Rutherford Cotton yift = 367.29 + 18.566/ 1.360 
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Crop budgets developed by University of Tennessee Extension were consulted to 
determine the return to land, management, and risk for varying crop yields. Returns were 
assumed to increase (decrease) linearly with yield. For crops that had budgets for more 
than one yield goal, the return predicting formulas were piecewise linear functions that 
apply over distinct ranges of yield. In the case of com, for example, budgets were 
available for yield goals of 120 and 150 bushels per acre. The returns are estimated by 
straight lines between the expected returns at each yield goal for which a budget was 
available, assuming also that the expected returns for a yield goal of zero bushels per acre 
would be zero dollars. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 exemplify these functions with graphs for 
com and soybeans. After estimating linear or linear piecewise functions to predict the 
returns for each crop according to expected yield, each of the weighted average expected 
current yields was plugged into its respective formula to obtain a weighted, per acre 
return to land, management and risk for each crop on each crop buffer feature by county 
and soil mapping unit. The formulas below show how returns respond to expected yield 
for each crop: 
!y iO * 0 .4523 lf w < 120 
<l>u; = f u; * 1 .2 1 - 80 .24 fo
r f u; > 120 for com, 
<I> w = y w * I . 5 94 5 for soybeans, and 
<l>m = Y w * 0 .03462 1 for cotton 
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Where: 
<l>w is the weighted average current expected return to land, management, and risk 
for crop i on mapping unit j in county f, 
Y w is the weighted average current expected yield for crop i in county fin 
mapping unitj, and 
the numeric parameters are derived from UT Extension crop budgets for com, . 
soybeans, and cotton. 
A weighted average return per acre was then calculated for each buffer feature by 
summing the products of the crop returns multiplied by their crop-mix proportions 
according to the county data in the following way: 
Ilo = LE if *  <l>w 
i=l 
Where: 
Il.fi is the weighted average return per acre on mapping unitj in county f, 
Eif is the p�oportion of cropland in crop i in county f, 
<l>w is the weighted average current expected return to land, management and risk 
from crop i in county f on mapping unit j, and 
n is the total number of crops grown in county f. 
County crop proportions used to develop these weighted average returns per acre are 
presented in Table 4.2. The per acre returns are the opportunity cost of the cropland, or 
the expected returns that producers would forego by installing a buffer strip on the land. 
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Table 4.2: Crop Proportions by County 
County Corn (%) Soybeans (%) Cotton (%) 
Cheatham 29 7 1  0 
Davidson 52 48 · O 
Dickson 67 33 0 
Hickman 41  59 0 
Rutherford 34 5 1  15  
Williamson 36 64 0 
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Agricultural land classified by the 1992 NLCD as "pasture/hay" was all assumed 
to be pasture land for the purposes of this study, since about 70% of hay in Tennessee is 
. . . grown for on-farm use in livestock operations, implying that many hayfields may 
occasionally be used rotationally as pasture by livestock producers (US Department of 
Agriculture Economic Research Service). Such being the case, fencing for stream 
exclusion would be required for all land designated "pasture/hay," which may cause an 
overestimation of the costs of the requirement of a vegetative buffer strip on such land, 
since not all hay fields are likely to enter a grazing rotation. Costs of livestock exclusion 
for grazing management are reported in US EPA's National Management Measures for 
the Control of Nonpoint Pollution from Agriculture (US Environmental Protection 
Agency Office of Water 2003). 
The average reported cost of exclusion fencing, adjusted for inflation using the 
consumer price index, was $590.09 per mile. Each potential pasture buffer polygon has a 
perimeter in the ArcMap attribute table, which was used to calculate the required 
exclusion fencing for each polygon. Fencing needs were calculated according to the 
formulae: 
F




= (Bi -2  * 0.0284 1 miles)+ 2 if the polygon lay on one side of the 
water body, 
Where: 
F; is the number of miles of fence required for buffer feature i, 
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B; is the perimeter of buffer feature i in miles, and 
0.02841 mi. is the width of the buffer strip (150 ft.). 
The reason for subtracting four times ( two times) the buffer width from the perimeter for 
fields spanning water bodies (not spanning . . .  ) was the assumption that fencing already 
existed between pasture and other land uses adjacent to it, so the owner need not install 
fencing perpendicular to the riparian feature to achieve livestock exclusion. For pasture 
polygons on only one side of a water body, the owner need only install fencing on the 
pasture-side of the buffer, and not on the stream-side; therefore, the formula for buffers 
not straddling a water feature includes division by two. 
The number of miles of fencing needed for each potential pasture buffer was then 
multiplied by the per mile cost of permanent exclusion fencing ($590.09) to obtain a total 
exclusion cost for each potential buffer strip. Exclusion costs for some pasture features 
within the buffer area were negative because their perimeters were less than 300 feet for 
features on one side of a stream or less than 600 feet for features straddling a stream. 
Features with negative exclusion costs were assumed to be land use classification errors 
in the 1 992 NLCD, and were ignored in calculating costs. Eliminating these records 
should have little effect on the results because their areas were all less than one tenth of 
an acre, and those that were not errors are likely to be installed stream crossings for cattle 
or controlled stream access for watering, which could appropriately be permitted by the 
buffer regulation. The total exclusion cost for each buffer was divided by the acreage of 
the buff er to obtain a per acre exclusion cost for each potential buff er according to the 
following formula: 
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E; is the per acre exclusion cost for buffer feature i, 
F; is the miles of fencing needed for feature i, 
$590.09 is the per mile cost of permanent exclusion fencing, and 
A; is the acreage of buffer feature i. 
The opportunity cost of an acre of pasture was assumed to be approximately 
equivalent to the average rental rate for pasture, since the average rental rate should 
represent the average expected returns to land, management and risk for land owners. 
The USDA lists an average 2004 per acre cash rental rate for pasture in Tennessee as 
$ 19.00 (US Department of Agriculture National Agricultural Statistics Service). No 
attempt was made to account for varying soil fertilities among pasture lands because the 
proportion of the land in different forage crops was unknown, and the average rental rate 
was deemed sufficient to represent the opportunity cost of pasture. 
Of course, the opportunity cost ( and exclusion costs for pasture) incurred by 
taking land out of production are not the only costs of vegetated riparian buff er strips. 
There will also be a cost of establishment, as well as annual maintenance costs. 
According to Bonham, Bosch and Pease, the average cost of an herbaceous buffer strip is 
$32.79 per acre, including both the annualized establishment cost and the annual 
maintenance cost. This figure applies both to acreage that is currently in pasture, as well 
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as land currently in row crops. Thus, the total per acre cost of each buffer strip can be 
calculated as: 
Ci = ITJJ + $32.  79 for cropland buffers, and 
Ci = $ 1 9. 00 + E; + $ 3 2.  79 for pasture buffers, 
Where: 
C; is the total per acre cost of buffer strip i, 
II_o is the current weighted average expected per acre return from cropping in 
county /in mapping unitj, where buffer feature i lies, 
$ 19.00 is the expected return from the pasture land (the pasture rental rate), 
E; is the per acre exclusion cost for pasture buff er i, and 
$32. 79 is the annual cost of maintenance plus the annualized establishment cost. 
Having estimated a per acre total cost, as well as acreage, for each potential buffer strip, 
it was then possible to calculate the estimated total cost of a mandatory regulation 
requiring the installation of 150 foot buffer strips on all agricultural land bordering 
streams in the Harpeth River Watershed. 
The total cost of this regulatory approach could be calculated at this point by 
multiplying the acreage of each buffer by its total per acre cost and summing all these 
products as follows: 




Tis the total cost of mandatory 150 ft riparian buffer strips on all agricultural 
land, 
. . C; is the per acre cost of buff er feature i, 
A; is the acreage of buff er feature i, and 
n is the total number of potential buffer strips in the Watershed. 
The next step, which should be more interesting to advocates of tradable emissions rights, 
is to plot out this supply curve. Doing so entails the summation of the acreage of all 
potential buffers that would be supplied at various "prices" (using $5.00 price intervals) 
assuming that price equals marginal cost, or the cost of one additional acre of buffer. 
This process is described mathematically by the following formula: 
Where: 
p is a price level that is a multiple of $5.00, 
Sp is the acreage of all buffers supplied at price p, 
A; is the acreage of buffer feature i, and 
n is the total number of pasture and row crop features for which C; ::; p. 
This calculation was performed between the lowest and the highest per acre prices of all 
features to obtain a series of points on the supply schedule. Linearity is assumed between 
consecutive points to calculate integrals under various points on the curve. 
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Results 
Clipping the 1992 NLCD agricultural land use features to the 150 foot buff er 
around all NLCD riparian features in ArcMap and calculating the areas of all potential 
buffer strips yielded the result that in the Harpeth River Watershed, approximately 12,605 
acres, or eight percent, of agricultural land would be consumed by a regulation requiring 
150 foot riparian buff er strips on all agricultural land throughout the watershed. 
Approximately 8,663 acres of this potential agricultural buffer land is classified as 
"pasture/hay" by the land use data. The balance of the agricultural land use (3,942 acres) 
is classified as "row crops." 
The STATSGO Database shows portions of 14 different soil mapping units within 
the watershed, and provides the proportions of each of these mapping units covered by 
each of its soil types. Yields for each crop are also provided for all soil types upon which 
the crop was grown in 1994. Using these data, and the process described in the 
methodology section to create weighted average yields for each crop in each soil 
mapping unit provides com yields between 71  and 114 bushel per acre, soybean yields 
between 31  and 4 1  bushels per acre, and cotton yields between 471 and 750 pounds per 
acre. 
Multiplying the yield inflators (lif) by their respective 1994 soil mapping unit 
weighted average yields according to the county in which the potential buff er features lie 
returns com yields ranging between 83 and 158 bushels per acre, soybean yields ranging 
from 31 to 52 bushels per acre, and cotton yields ranging from 642 to 1039 pounds per 
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acre. Each potential buffer strip's weighted, inflated yield was then plugged into its 
respective formula to predict the expected returns from the crop on the buff er strip. 
Per acre returns range from $37.80 to $ 110.44 for com, $5 1.97 to $83.06 for soybeans, 
and $22.22 to $35.98 for cotton, depending on the soil mapping unit and county in which 
the potential buffer strip lies. 
After having estimated per acre returns for each crop on each buffer strip, the 
returns for each buff er strip were weighted by crop proportions in their respective 
counties so that a weighted average return to land, management and risk ( an opportunity 
cost) might be obtained for each cropland riparian buffer (Table 4.3). This number is 
assumed to be the per acre opportunity cost of each potential buffer. Per acre annualized 
establishment and annual maintenance costs of riparian buffer strips were then added to 
the opportunity costs of each buff er strip. The results are the total per acre costs of 
cropland riparian buffers, and they range from $77.92 to $ 117.87, with a mean of $98.50. 
The opportunity cost of pasture was assumed to be equivalent to the average rental rate 
for pasture in the state of Tennessee, or $ 19.00 per acre. Fencing costs are the other 
major component of buffer costs unique to pasture_ land. The formulas for calculating fencing needs and the per mile fencing costs reported in the methodology section were 
used to calculate fencing costs for each potential buffer strip. After eliminating all 
potential buffer strips with negative ca�le exclusion costs, and dividing the fencing costs 
of each buffer by its acreage, it was determined that the per acre exclusion costs range 
from $0.02 to $299.78 for the remaining 8,576 acres of pasture that lie within the buffer 
area. It should be noted here that eliminating buff er strips with negative cattle exclusion 
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Table 4.3 : Weighted Average Return to Land, Management, and Risk for Cropland 
County Mapping Unit Acres Opportunity Cost ($/ac) 
Cheatham TN054 72 60.05 
Cheatham TN064 34 84.05 
Cheatham TN073 1 73 55 .50 
Davidson TN054 4 5 1 .3 1 
Davidson TN064 101 80.34 
Davidson TN069 7 53.28 
Davidson TN07 1 6 7 1 .75 
Davidson TN072 5 5 1 .93 
Dickson TN048 26 57 .40 
Dickson TN054 1 93 55 .71 
Dickson TN060 649 53 .69 
Dickson TN073 36 52.55 
Hickman TN060 4 1  89.3 1 
Rutherford TN054 1 59.6 1 
Rutherford TN062 84 56.90 
Rutherford TN064 44 84.22 
Rutherford TN067 25 55 .32 
Rutherford TN076 23 1 52.46 
Williamson TN054 93 60.46 
Williamson TN060 2 1 7  57.6 1 
Williamson TN062 1 19 57.5 1 
Williamson TN064 877 85 .08 
Williamson TN066 44 64.89 
Williamson TN067 328 55.73 
Williamson TN069 170 66.68 
Williamson TN07 1 362 75.9 1 
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costs eliminated virtually all pasture features with areas less than 0.1 acre. In fact, it 
seems that buffer features with areas very close to 0. 1 acre are likely to be near the ends 
of the range of per acre exclusion costs, suggesting the possibility of some systematic 
error, the effect of which is reduced for larger buffer areas. For each buffer feature, 
opportunity cost (the rental rate) plus the exclusion fencing price were considered the 
total cost of an acre of pasture. Annualized establishment costs and annual maintenance 
costs for the vegetative buffer strips were then added to the exclusion and opportunity 
costs, resulting in total per acre costs of pasture buffers ranging from $51.81 to $351, 
with a mean of $111.97. 
The cost of taking all the buffer land (including pasture and cropland) out of 
production was then calculated using the formula for T mentioned under the previous 
subheading, yielding the result that the total cost of a regulation requiring 150 foot 
grassed riparian buffer strips on the stream edges of all agricultural fields in the Harpeth 
River watershed would be approximately $ 1,318,695 annually to remove about 12,245 
acres from production and establish and maintain riparian vegetation thereon. This cost 
burden would clearly be distributed disproportionately among agricultural producers, as 
some might even remain unaffected because their land does not border riparian features. 
The supply curve was approximated by summing all the agricultural acreage that would 
be offered as riparian buffers at various prices, moving through the range of per acre 
costs of buffer strips at intervals of $5.00, and the supply curve is shown in Figure 4.4. If 
society wanted to purchase full implementation of buffer strips, the total payment to 
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Figure 4.4: Buffer Supply Curve for the Harpeth River Watershed 
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would collectively receive $3,028,500 worth of producer surplus, assuming the law of 
one price. On the other hand, because 97.9% of the buffer acreage is available at a cost 
. . . below $ 150.00, society could achieve almost the same level of implementation at a much 
lower total cost, since the supply curve becomes nearly vertical when about 12,000 acres 
of buff er strips have been purchased. The total cost to agricultural producers of installing 
buffer strips on the least-cost 11,990 acres (97 .9% implementation) would be 
approximately $ 1,276,200. This level of voluntary implementation would require a 
payment of $ 1,798,850 to agricultural buffer producers, providing them a producer 
surplus of $522,650. 
Conclusions 
This study has presented a methodology for developing a supply curve for 
agricultural riparian buffer strips, which have the potential to greatly reduce nutrient 
content in agricultural runoff. This supply curve has the additional benefit of establishing 
a fairly narrow price range for a riparian buffer strip, between $85 and $ 150 for about 
94.9% of the potential agricultural buffer acreage. Though well-functioning markets 
generally establish their own equilibrium prices and quantities, such methodology and the 
predictive information it provides may be valuable in seeking to establish market-based 
tradable discharge permit systems. The next step in predicting market behavior is to use 
some in-depth water quality modeling to attempt to convert this buffer supply curve into 
an NPS nutrient reduction credit supply curve. Further research could quantify PSs' 
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marginal willingness to pay, or demand, for NPS nitrogen reduction credits in the 
watershed. 
There are obvious limitations to this study, many of which result from data 
limitations. For example, the riparian shape files from the NHD are line features, as 
opposed to polygon features, meaning that the actual interfaces between agriculturallands 
and waterways are sometimes not found within a 150 foot buff er around the riparian line 
features. This means that available buffer acreage may be under represented in some 
areas, especially on the main stem of the Harpeth River, where the water is wide, as they 
say. Yet, agricultural activities are not nearly as abundant near the main stem as they are 
in the upper reaches, or eastern portion, of the Harpeth River Watershed. Thus, this data 
limitation may not be as pronounced as one might expect if agricultural activities were 
distributed homogenously throughout the watershed. The issue of error in stream, land 
use interface identification also contributes to error in the calculation of exclusion fencing 
costs for pasture land, which will depend on the shape and size of the potential buffer 
feature, which are partially determined by the proximity to the riparian line features. 
Ideally, data that shows the shapes and areas of all riparian features in the watershed 
should be used for a study like this; however, such data are not currently available for a 
sufficiently large region. 
This methodology does not account for the cost of alternate watering systems for 
cattle that are to be excluded from stream access. These costs ought to be included, as 
they would be incurred as a direct result of complete cattle exclusion; however, in order 
to calculate such costs, we would need to know how many cattle are on how much 
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pasture, as well as which elements of the "pasture/hay" land use classification are 
actually pasture, as opposed to hay. 
. . . Additionally, farmers who establish buffer strips are also likely to modify 
practices elsewhere in their operations. These modifications may have adverse results or 
provide unexpected benefits for society as a whole. This study does not account for the 
private benefits to agricultural producers brought about as a result of reduced erosion and 
increased stream bank stability provided by buffer strips. These private benefits, 
inasmuch as agricultural producers believe they exist, will reduce their perceived 
opportunity costs, thus reducing the total cost of any given level of buff er strip 
implementation below those described by the supply schedule. To assess these potential 
private benefits, extensive in situ work and modeling would need to be performed so that 
the reduced effects of erosion could be estimated and monetized for each potential buff er 
strip. Such modeling could also be used estimate the differential environmental impacts 
of buffer strip implementation on distinctive potential buffer strips. This information 
could be used to develop a supply curve for nitrogen reduction credits from NPSs. 
However, the supply of agricultural riparian buffer strip will change substantially 
with the passage of time, especially in a rapidly developing area like the Harpeth River 
Watershed, which is home to Nashville and its various extensions, which are rapidly 
expanding. Thus, the potential for agricultural NPS reductions changes as land use 
changes. In this particular watershed, as in most, NPS remains the major source of 
nutrient loadings, however, an increasing proportion of these loadings is coming from 
urban and suburban land, as agricultural land is being converted to new uses. These 
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situations are not static, and equilibrium for a market in buffer strips will be constantly 
changing in watersheds that are rapidly developing. 
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Chapter V 
Summary & Conclusion 
WQT may be an important part of a cost-effective solution to persistent water 
quality impairments caused by nutrients and other oxygen demanding pollutants in some 
watersheds, though PSs-PSs trading may not be viable at all in other areas. The Question 
to answer prior to attempting the establishment of such a program is whether balanced 
supply and demand for nutrient credits will exist in a potential market area. Chapter III 
of this thesis lays out a methodology that results in PS-NPS WQT scores for the various 
potential trading regions of Tennessee, which are defined within eight-digit HUC 
boundaries by the flow of water across 12-digit HUC boundaries. These potential trading 
areas are ranked based on the relative nitrogen contributions from PSs and NPSs to their 
water quality impairments. These relative loads are based on measures of the extent of 
loadings at the source and the distance of the source from the impairments. Three 
potential trading areas (South Fork Forked Deer, Stones, and North Fork Forked Deer 
River Watersheds) scored well above the rest, suggesting that these three watersheds 
merit particular attention to the potential for WQT to assist in reducing the cost of 
compliance with ambient environmental water quality standards. It would be prudent to 
assess these areas in greater detail with regard to their suitability for WQT in conjunction 
with the development of nutrient, organic enrichment, and low dissolved oxygen TMDLs 
for their water bodies. 
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Chapter IV presents the methodology and results of a process designed to 
approximate a supply curve for agricultural riparian grassed buffer strips for the Harpeth 
· River Watershed in Middle Tennessee. Unfortunately, the process does not directly 
assess the supply ofNPS nitrogen credit reductions from agriculture, but the derived 
supply curve bears some relationship to that for nitrogen reduction credits. 
The papers that comprise this thesis have the potential to improve the prospects 
for cost-effectively achieving the environmental quality standards that government 
agencies have set. If WQT has a· place in the solution, this work has identified some 
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